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Abstract
Theminilateral approach of a climate club of countries has been suggested as an intermediate phase in
a transition towards a global agreement that enforces national climate policies through harmoniza-
tion. To garner criticalmass, we propose an extended club configuration including sub-national states
or provinces, resulting in amulti-level club. This would allow considerable contributions from
important emitters like theUS to be brought on board, relevant given its intendedwithdrawal from
the Paris Agreement.We elaborate this idea and clarify potential roles of participants at distinct levels.
The concept is operationalized by developing amethod for identifying suitable entities at each level
that uses a set of likelihood-of-involvement indicators capturing existing carbon dependence, public
opinion, government policy and climate coalitionmembership. Application at the national level
identifies a subset of seven of the highest emitting countries representing 21%of global emissions.
This rises to 51%assuming that China, the dominant global emitter, could be enticed into the group.
Given thatUS involvement remains unlikely for now, we illustrate selection at the sub-national level
forUS states. Here, an initial group of 21 states appear as potentialmembers, jointly accounting for
36%of national emissions. An additional group, representing a further 34%of emissions, are
potentially receptive to enticement via trade dependencies on four key countries identifiedwithin the
group of nationalmembers. Accordingly, some 70%ofUS emissions, representing 11%of global
totals,may be subject to climate club involvement via a combination of these pathways.While the
implementation of such a club requires various political and legal hurdles to be overcome, the ongoing
threat of climate change and inadequacies of the Paris Agreement suggest that novel solutions of this
kind deserve serious attention from scientists and politicians.
1. Introduction
The United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) has now been widely
accepted as the default facilitator of global negotiations
on climate issues (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and McGee
2013). However, the multilateral approach it employs
has been slow to address the ongoing threat of global
warming, primarily owing to the logistical limitations
of large groups and the voluntary nature of involve-
ment (Nordhaus 2015). Indeed, the two most ambi-
tious initiatives undertaken by the UNFCCC thus
far—the defunct Kyoto Protocol and the current Paris
Agreement—have both relied on voluntary actions,
meaning that levels of commitment and compliance
among member countries have not been uniform in
nature. Accordingly, the incentive for self-interested
parties to free-ride continues to be present.
Acknowledging the limitations of this approach,
many are now suggesting the importance of alternative
solutions. One of the more promising of these is the
minilateral approach of a climate coalition or club of
ambitious countries that implements a uniform pol-
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so-called ‘climate club’ would offer exclusive trade
benefits or club goods to members and seek to attract
furthermembership by imposing penalties on imports
from non-members to limit unfair competition from
unregulated production sources. By creating moral
and economic pressure on other countries, the club
would likely expand over time. Once critical mass is
achieved, it could grow to cover the bulk of global
emissions and potentially influence post-Paris
UNFCCC negotiations to focus on global policy coor-
dination rather than mere targets (Eckersley 2012,
Nordhaus 2015).
Attempting to affect environmental change in
smaller groups outside of the UNFCCC framework
has a number of key benefits. Firstly, it is thought that
smaller groups enable negotiations to be undertaken
more efficiently, which may result in faster and more
streamlined responses (Biermann et al 2009, Weischer
et al 2012). This is especially critical when mitigating a
problem such as climate change, where time is a deci-
sive factor. Secondly, smaller groups of like-minded
participants are able to tackle ‘narrow-but-deep’ goals
and achieve much more focused and ambitious out-
comes than larger disparate groups (Aldy et al 2003).
Additionally, the relatively simple and egalitarian
nature of climate clubs that results from homo-
geneous market policies presents less barriers and
encourages entry to a broader spectrum of stake-
holders (Biermann et al 2009, Weitzman 2014).
Lastly, countries which have consistently blocked
ambitious proposals at UNFCCC Conference of the
Parties meetings—particularly oil exporters such as
Russia and Australia—will continue to do so, mean-
ing that the current mechanisms of the UNFCCC are
unlikely to lead to global policy harmonization (King
and van den Bergh 2019). It is particularly telling in
this respect that the Nationally Determined Con-
tributions of the ten largest fossil fuel producers
under the Paris Agreement lack any policy limiting
fossil fuel supply, with the exception of India (Piggot
et al 2017).
Notwithstanding such observations, another com-
pelling aspect of climate club membership lies in the
economic benefits it provides. Empirical modeling
that tested four target carbon prices and 11 tariff rates
for non-members for a range of club configurations
found that net gains in welfare were achieved for the
club under all regimes, even using lower carbon prices
and tariff rates (Nordhaus 2015). Higher benefits were
reaped as the prices and tariffs increased. And, while
not all members benefitted under all combinations
tested, individual net gains were achieved 88% of the
time. Tellingly, many of the simple regimes tested
resulted in all seven major emitters achieving simulta-
neous benefits. As such, climate clubs are not only cap-
able of providing a feasible reduction in emissions but
are thought to offer more immediate financial benefits
tomembers under themajority of configurations.
2. Climate clubs beyond countries
Interest in minilateral solutions to climate change has
increased in recent years and a great deal of discussion
regarding the characteristics and potential benefits of
climate club arrangements can be found in the
literature (Leycegui and Ramírez 2015, Nordhaus
2015, Victor 2015, Falkner 2016, Gampfer 2016, Hovi
et al 2016, Keohane et al 2017, Nordhaus 2017,
Victor 2017, Sprinz et al 2018, Hagen and Eisenack
2019, Paroussos et al 2019). Nevertheless, discussions
on the subject to date have tended to assume that
membership would be limited to national actors. Yet,
in countries with considerable spatial variation in
terms of economic activities and climate policies,
membership could also be offered to sub-national
governments who wish to deviate from national
actions by implementing their own, more ambitious
climate policies. Indeed, a growing number of such
government bodies are mobilizing to address climate
change and implement stricter emissions targets
within coalition groups, often as a direct reaction to
weak policy or inaction at the national level.
As the effectiveness of a climate club is largely
determined by the share of emissions and economic
influence of its members, we contend that a multi-
level club could target motivated potential members
with high economic pull and emissions reduction
capacities regardless of the strata of government they
occupy. Furthermore, the participation of significant
sub-national entities may ultimately also be capable of
imposing critical pressure on national governments to
consider clubmembership.
Nevertheless, as club members, sub-national gov-
ernments are unlikely to be capable of imposing trade
barriers on imports from non-members. For example,
it is doubtful that individual states within the United
States (US) could legally impose trade restrictions on
other countries as members of a climate club. Theore-
tically, Article 1, section 10 of theUSConstitution pre-
vents states from imposing their own trade policies on
other states or foreign countries unless permitted to do
so by Congress. Such actions have proven difficult in
the past and would seem very unlikely to be approved
by the current legislative branch of the federal govern-
ment, particularly for purposes that directly challenge
the policies of the current administration.
However, sub-national members such as US states
would still be able to implement the uniform climate
policies of the club internally, be exempted from
carbon border tariffs on trade with national club
members, benefit from club goods such as R&D coop-
eration and, in the case of high-profile sub-national
members, provide legitimacy to the club as a whole.
This introduces a club design consisting of two types
of members: (1) countries that can enjoy club goods
and both employ and avoid penalties; and (2) sub-
national governments that can enjoy club goods and
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be enticed into clubs to avoid penalties imposed by
existingmembers.
At the receiving end, the application of trade
penalties within a multi-level climate club arrange-
ment may indeed be complicated by the fact that sub-
nationalmembers are positioned within the trade bor-
ders of a non-member country and are thus liable to
pay the penalties that apply to the country as a whole.
Administratively, it would seem complex for a climate
club to only apply penalties to certain regions of a non-
member country. A simpler solution could be to apply
penalties to all sales from non-member countries and
then return those penalties to sub-national members
as part of a ‘refund’ scheme.
3. Assessing potential clubmembers
In order to predict the ‘likelihood-of-involvement’ for
governments at multiple levels, we developed a
method that utilizes four complementary criteria: (1)
carbon independence; (2) public opinion regarding
climate change; (3) government policy position; and
(4) climate coalition membership. The first criterion
quantifies the lack of dependence on carbon-intensive
industries by comparing the gross domestic product
(GDP) or gross state product (GSP) earned per tonne
ofCO2 emitted. The second criterion captures the level
of localized voter support for action on climate change
and, thus, the likelihood of governments implement-
ingmore stringent climate policies. The third criterion
considers the current political leanings or policy
positions of government bodies with respect to climate
issues. The fourth and final criterion assesses the
extent of local involvement in the growing number of
climate-related coalition groups. While these criteria
may correlate, they are largely complementary in
scope and are believed to provide a good indication of
a location’s ambitions regarding climate policy and
hence its potential willingness to be involved in an
international climate club.
As a first step, the maximum score for each criter-
ion was used to normalize individual scores on a scale
from 0 to 1. Where more than one source exists for a
given criterion, normalized scores were initially calcu-
lated for the individual sources and then averaged to
generate an overall score for the criterion. The final
likelihood-of-involvement scores were then derived
by aggregating the normalized scores for all criteria.
This was achieved by calculating a geometric mean as
this method is believed to deliver a more meaningful
outcome for indicators of this kind than using an
arithmetic mean (Ebert and Welsch 2004). A higher
final aggregated score is interpreted as indicating that a
country or state is more motivated to undertake cli-
mate action and, therefore, more likely to consider
membership in a climate club. A full description of the
data, method and sensitivity analysis used is provided




for the 15 countries4 with the highest carbon emission
rates utilizing the data sources listed in table 1. The
results, as shown in figure 1, suggest that two distinct
groups of countries exist. A group of seven ‘likely’ club
members—including the EU, Japan, South Korea,
Canada, Brazil, Mexico and Australia–were deemed to
be the most receptive to club membership. These
countries represent approximately 20.5% of global
Table 1.Criteria used for assessing likelihood-of-involvement of 15 countries with the highest carbon emission rates.
Criteria Description Relevance Source
Carbon independence ‘Cleanliness’ or lack of dependence on
carbon-intensive industries in
generating income.Defined asGDP
earned per tonne of CO2 emitted
Reflects ability to conform to club
emission standards or integrate
other carbon-relatedmechanisms
into local economy. A lower value
of this indicator increases the
likelihood of considering club
membership




Composite of data from two public
opinion polls relating to climate
change issues
Reflects voter concern about climate
change and support ofmitigation
strategies. Indicates likelihood of
prioritizing climate change and
considering clubmembership
Pugliese andRay (2009) and





pledge under the Paris Agreement.
Reflects current government policy
on climate change. Indicates
likelihood of considering club
membership
Climate Action Tracker




Involvement of governments in
current climate-focused coalitions
Reflects current policy on climate





The term ‘countries’ is used hereafter for all potential national
members, including the EuropeanUnion (EU).
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carbon emissions. It is also noted that this group
includes all Group of Seven (G7) members except
theUS.
A relative gap of some 25.5% then exists between
Japan (0.606) and the US (0.451) as the seventh and
eighth highest scoring countries, respectively. This
represents a significant increase compared to the
intervals observed within the ‘likely’ group, where
changes were generally around 2%–3% and all were
less than 9%. Accordingly, this acts as the delineation
point between the ‘likely’ group and a second group of
eight ‘not likely’ club members. This group consists of
China, the US, India, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, South
Africa and Indonesia.
Because these results were derived by taking the
geometric means of four normalized indicators, equal
weighting was implicitly applied. As a sensitivity test,
six alternative combinations using two weightings at
10% and another two at 40%were examined (see sup-
plementary materials). Although slight variations
occurred in their order, the countries within each
group remained constant for all combinations sug-
gesting a consistency and robustness in the delineation
between the two groups.
As the third-highest emitter with the second-high-
est GDP, the EU is the most desirable potential club
member within the group of more ‘likely’ countries in
terms of potential emissions reduction and economic
influence. Four EU countries—France, Germany,
Italy and theUnitedKingdom—alongsideCanada and
Japan represent six of the seven members of the G7, a
group considered by the International Monetary Fund
to represent the world’s seven largest ‘advanced
economies’. Moreover, the EU currently has active
trade agreements with three other members of the
‘likely’ group—Japan, South Korea and Mexico—and
only one member of the ‘not likely’ group (South
Africa). This suggests that a substantial level of influ-
ence and existing affiliations exist within the identified
‘likely’ countries, with the EU as the member with the
highest apparent level of potential influence.
The capacity of the EU to guide initiatives of this
kind is not only demonstrated by empirical data. It
also has a long history of leadership within the sphere
of climate change mitigation activities (Parker and
Karlsson 2010, Schmidt and Fleig 2018) and has tradi-
tionally shown greater commitment to UNFCCC pro-
grams than either China or the US (Keohane and
Victor 2011, Sommer and Hain 2017). Following a
period of reinvention in the UNFCCC following the
2009 Copenhagen Summit, the EU adopted the addi-
tional role of both leader and mediator by attempting
to reconcile the growing concern of the developing
world with the apparent reticence of the US and China
(Bäckstrand and Elgström 2013). As such, it played a
key role in the coordination of what was to become the
Paris Agreement (Oberthür andGroen 2017).
5. Challenges at the national level
Notwithstanding the elevated likelihood of EU mem-
bership, the second ‘not likely’ group includes both the
US and China—the two highest emitters with the
highest and third-highest GDPs. Two such high-
profile countries remaining outside such a club is likely
Figure 1.Normalized indicators and final ‘net likelihood’ scores for top 15 carbon emitting countries in order of current CO2 emission
levels (World Bank 2017a). Large red rings denote seven ‘likely’ countries and small-sized rings denote eight ‘not likely’ countries.
A threshold line delineating the two categories is also shown.
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to greatly limit its chances of success. Indeed, previous
modeling simulations found that climate clubs are far
more likely to be successful with US involvement
(Hovi et al 2019, Sprinz et al 2018).
It is nevertheless worth noting that previous mod-
eling simulations also suggest that it would be rela-
tively easy for others to entice China into a club (Hovi
et al 2019) and that, alongside India, China has the
most to gain from club membership (Paroussos et al
2019). This is predominantly the result of the high
volume of emissions it produces, the high cost of
energy transitions and its vulnerability to the ongoing
impacts of global emissions. As the world’s highest
emitter of carbon—producing some 30.4% of global
totals—China imposes a huge cost on its own future,
and should be less sensitive to free-rider temptation
than smaller players. What is more, it already appears
to be implementing more sustainable domestic energy
policies (Green and Stern 2017) and to be making
greater efforts to raise its profile on the international
climate stage. Furthermore, China and the EU have
recently announced a joint commitment to intensify
implementation of the Paris Agreement and
strengthen their ties on climate change and clean
energy issues (European Commission 2018). In light
of this evidence, it is assumed that, in reality, China is
more likely to consider clubmembership than our cal-
culations suggest. This is especially true if the EU were
to initiate such a club. As a result, 50.9% of global car-
bon emissions would be encompassed within this
group of eight countries.
In any case, what remains clear is that, considering
the Trump administration’s ongoing intention to
withdraw from the Paris Agreement in 2020, USmem-
bership in a climate club regimewould appear unlikely
for now. That leaves it as the ‘odd one out’ of the three
key countries highlighted as preferred members of a
potential climate club situation. Being the second-
highest emitter with the highest GDP, the non-
inclusion of the US would represent a major challenge
for the feasibility of implementing a truly effective glo-
bal climate club.
Although Trump’s decision to step away from the
Paris Agreement came as no surprise, the news was
greeted with widespread condemnation in the US and
abroad (Diringer 2017). Perhaps the most visible reac-
tion to the announcement was the rapid mobilization
of coalitions of companies and sub-national govern-
ment bodies specifically denouncing the decision and
vowing to uphold the spirit of the Paris Agreement and
prioritize climate change mitigation efforts. Two of
the most significant—the Under2 Coalition, a global
alliance spearheaded by California governor Jerry
Brown, and the Mayors National Climate Action
Agenda (‘Climate Mayors’)—were organized in
advance of the 2015 Paris conference but subsequently
revitalized by Trump’s statement (Alvarez 2017,
Henderson 2017, State of California 2017). The most
notable others—We Are Still In and the United States
Climate Alliance—were formed as a direct reaction to
Trump’s election and expected withdrawal (Crooks
2017,Worland 2017).
Despite this apparent gridlock at the national level,
the proliferation and consolidation of determined
sub-national governments suggests that US involve-
ment in international climate clubs could take the
form of membership by motivated states as part of a
multi-level configuration. Existing coalitions may
even be capable of building upon their present rela-
tionships to negotiate with—or even aid in initiating
—burgeoning clubs as a collective unit. Furthermore,
as a notably decentralized country, where individual
states are able to enact relatively high levels of political
decision-making at the local level, the US is an ideal
candidate for operationalizing the multi-level club
notion.
As many states control significant economies with
high emissions in their own right—some exceeding
those of many of the top 20 countries in both of these
dimensions—such an arrangement could offer a path-
way for more enthusiastic governments to sidestep the
current administration and achieve significant reduc-
tions in overall US emissions. This could be achieved
via involvement of single states, or integration of
regional coalitions of states, in pre-existing interna-
tional clubs. Operational climate clubs may also prove
capable of using the market-based mechanisms that
drive them to entice otherwise reluctant US states
towards a climate club arrangement, particularly
where strong trade dependencies with member coun-
tries exist.
6. Potential US statemembers
In order to estimate the likelihood of individual US
states to consider membership in an international
climate club the previous method for assessing poten-
tialmembers was applied toUS states utilizing the data
sources listed in table 2. Recognizing the complexity of
political mechanisms in the US, it is acknowledged
that one cannot fully capture the myriad factors that
determine the likelihood of state involvement in a
climate club. Nevertheless, the chosen data is thought
to provide a reasonable indication of the general public
and governmental tendencies of each state.
The assessment ultimately assigns each state as
being ‘very likely’, ‘moderately likely’ or ‘not likely’ to
consider involvement in a climate club situation.
While classifying groups is always somewhat arbitrary,
three groups were defined based on the size of the rela-
tive gaps between scores.
Ultimately, 12 of the 50 states were selected as
being ‘very likely’ to consider club membership. The
relative gap between the lowest ranked state in this first
group, New Jersey (12th, 0.838), and the next state,
New Hampshire (13th, 0.803), corresponds to a
change of 4.2%, the highest of the first 12 intervals
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(most others are less than 2%). Observation of the data
for these states also reveals a notable consistency in
high scoring across most or all categories when com-
pared to the states that follow. The resulting group of
‘very likely’ states collectively cover a total of 17.8% of
the total emissions and 36.6%ofGDP.
New York and California are the key candidates
for climate club membership in this group; their like-
lihood scores occupy the second and fourth rankings,
while they control the third-largest and largest state
economies, respectively, jointly accounting for 22.1%
of total GDP. In fact, as countries, California and New
York would represent the fifth and eighth largest
economies in the world. What is more, California is
the second-highest emitting state while New York sits
at number nine.
Almost all gaps between scores for the remaining
38 states are less than 2%. The only notable exceptions
are the 5.6% interval between Virginia (14th, 0.786)
and Maine (15th, 0.742), the 4.6% interval between
Florida (21st, 0.699) and New Mexico (22nd, 0.667)
and the 5.2% interval between Arizona (27th, 0.641)
and Ohio (28th, 0.608). As the gap between Virginia
andMaine occurs only two positions after the previous
group this interval is not deemed suitable. Meanwhile,
the individual characteristics of states as far down the
list as Arizona indicate diminishing tendencies
towards climate action and these could not realistically
be considered ‘likely’ states. Accordingly, the interval
between Florida and New Mexico is thought to pro-
vide the most suitable delineation between the
‘moderately likely’ and ‘not likely’ groups based on the
size and location of the observed gaps and trends
observed in the data for the individual states within
this range.
So, while the nine states within the final ‘moder-
ately likely’ group display less noteworthy results
than the former (‘very likely’) group, they do never-
theless offer some suggestion of a willingness to con-
sider membership in initiatives such as climate clubs
when compared to the 29 remaining states. This
group of ‘moderately likely’ states collectively
account for 18.2% of emissions and 19.8% of GDP.
Considering their emissions and GSP, the two most
significant states in this list are Illinois and Florida,
among states the fourth and sixth highest emitters
with the fifth and fourth largest economies,
respectively.
The final results for each state, in order of CO2
emissions, are shown in figure 2. All ‘very likely’ and
‘moderately likely’ states are further summarized in
table 3 while a complete listing of the indicator data is
provided in the supplementarymaterials.
As a sensitivity test, six alternative combinations
using two weightings at 10% and another two at 40%
were again examined (see supplementary materials).
While slight variations occurred in the order, the states
contained within each group remained largely con-
stant with a small number of exceptions. The top 12
‘very likely’ group members remained within the
group for all combinations testedwith the exception of
Delaware and New Jersey which transferred out of the
Table 2.Criteria used for assessing likelihood-of-involvement of US states.
Criteria Description Relevance Source
Carbon independence ‘Cleanliness’ or lack of dependence
on carbon-intensive industries in
generating income. Defined as
GSP earned per tonne of CO2
emitted
Reflects ability to conform to club
emission standards or integrate
other carbon-relatedmechan-
isms into local economy. A
lower value increases the like-
lihood of considering club
membership
Bureau of Economic Analysis





Public opinion poll data relating to
climate change issues
Reflects voter concern about cli-
mate change and support of
mitigation strategies. Indicates
likelihood of prioritizing cli-
mate change and considering
clubmembership
Howe et al (2015)
Government policy
position
Composite indication of political
position (Republican or
otherwise) based on presidential
voting and composition of
legislative branches at federal
and state level
Reflects current government com-
position considering the
increasingly partisan division on
climate issues inUS politics.
States with lower Republican
Party influence are broadly
assumed to bemore likely of
consider clubmembership
Federal ElectionCommission
(2016), United States Senate









action on climate change. Indi-
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top group during four scenarios. Both states possess
high public opinion and government scores andmod-
erate carbon dependence but are sensitive to variations
in coalition membership weighting as a result of their
low scores in this category.
Similar observations pertain to Michigan, Nevada
and Illinois within the ‘moderately likely’ group. All
three states have exceptionally low membership in
coalitions despite scoring well in public opinion and
government categories. As a result, they fell out of the
group during six, three and one of the sensitivity sce-
narios, respectively. However, as the groupings were
generally shown to be resilient to these changes, and
the observed substitutions all related to the coalition
Figure 2.Normalized indicators and final ‘net likelihood’ scores forUS states in order of current CO2 emission levels (USEnergy
Information Administration 2018). Large red rings denote 12 ‘very likely’ states,medium-sized rings denote nine ‘moderately likely’
states and small rings denote 29 ‘not likely’ states. Threshold lines delineating the three categories are also shown. The names of all
states identified as ‘very likely’ and ‘moderately likely’ are highlighted in gray.
Table 3. Indicator scores for 12 ‘very likely’ states and nine ‘moderately likely’ states, ranked infinal order of likelihood.
State
Likelihood-of-involvement
%of total USCO2 emissions %of total USGDP Score Ranking Rating
Mass 1.2 2.7 0.961 1 Very likely
NYork 3.1 8.1 0.953 2
Connecticut 0.6 1.4 0.924 3
California 6.6 14.0 0.919 4
Maryland 1.1 2.1 0.882 5
R Island 0.2 0.3 0.876 6
Vermont 0.1 0.2 0.862 7
Washington 1.4 2.5 0.859 8
Oregon 0.7 1.2 0.858 9
Delaware 0.2 0.4 0.850 10
Hawaii 0.3 0.5 0.847 11
N Jersey 2.1 3.2 0.838 12
NHampshire 0.3 0.4 0.803 13 Moderately likely
Virginia 1.9 2.7 0.786 14
Maine 0.3 0.3 0.742 15
Minnesota 1.8 1.8 0.735 16
Illinois 4.3 4.3 0.725 17
Nevada 0.7 0.8 0.721 18
Colorado 1.7 1.8 0.711 19
Michigan 3.0 2.6 0.704 20
Florida 4.2 5.0 0.699 21
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criterion, we can conclude that the results are con-
sistent and robust overall.
To summarize, a total of 21 states were found to
display tendencies that mark them as more likely can-
didates for considering club membership, represent-
ing a total of 36.0%of national emissions and 56.3%of
GDP. The remaining 29 states were deemed to be ‘not
likely’ in the analysis. Significantly, ten of the highest
15 emitters are in this group, including Texas as the
highest overall emitter with the second-highest GSP.
As we demonstrate in the following section, a func-
tional climate club could entice some of these states
intomembership via a trade-relatedmechanism.
7. State-country trade as a push force for
additional statemembership
The ability of operational multi-level climate clubs to
entice new members can be further understood by
examining existing international trade links with US
states. The previous analysis attempted to identify states
with higher likelihoods of considering climate club
membership solely based on their individual character-
istics. However, once a club is in operation, member
nations may be capable of enticing even the less ‘likely’
US states via the power of existing trade dependencies.
States with particularly high dependencies on club
member countries may consider membership simply in
order tomaintainbeneficial trade relationships andavoid
the impositionof tradepenalties onnon-members.
Examining international exports from individual
US states (United States Census Bureau 2018) identi-
fied the top four US trading partners as the EU,
Canada, Mexico and China. Since the previous analy-
sis of potential members at the national level found the
involvement of three of these to be likely, and provided
additional reasons for China to be included, the four
key US trading partners could potentially exert pres-
sure on certain US states to join the climate club.With
this in mind, figure 3 reports data on state exports to
each of these countries and their sum (‘Four Com-
bined’) as a percentage of the GSP for that state (see
supplementary materials for full listing). Previously
identified ‘likely’ states are highlighted in gray.
Considering all 50 states, the third quartile (75th
percentile) of these scores is some 5.7% of GSP. The
results indicate that exports from several states—
many of which are among the highest emitters—are
well above this level. What’s more, a total of 10 pre-
viously ‘not likely’ states—accounting for 33.9% of
national emissions and 21.4% of GDP—are among
those with trade dependencies on the EU, Canada,
Mexico and China that are well above the national
average. This includes five of the seven highest emit-
ting ‘not likely’ states, all of whomare within the coun-
try’s top 12 highest emitting states overall.
Themost notable state in this list is Texas—the top
carbon emitter with the second-highest GSP—which
sells 61.4% of its total exports to these four countries
and 37.0% toMexico alone. These exports account for
some 10.6% of the state’s total GSP, making it the
fourth highest of all 50 states in this category. Indeed,
Texas was highlighted as being particularly vulnerable
to revenue losses when Donald Trump threatened to
withdraw from theNorth American Free Trade Agree-
ment in 2018 for this very reason (Roberts 2018).
Figure 3.US state exports sold to four key countries and combined sumof all four as percentage of gross state product (GSP).
Threshold line representing the 75th percentile of combined scores is also shown. States previously identified as ‘very likely’ and
‘moderately likely’ climate clubmembers are highlighted in gray.
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Other notable states in the list include Louisiana and
Kentucky—the seventh and twelfth highest carbon
emitting states—which have the third and second-
highest proportion of exports toGSP, respectively.
On the strength of such results, it seems plausible
that the EU,Canada,Mexico andChina could be capable
of using the power of these trade dependencies to entice
additional high-profile US states into considering mem-
bership in club arrangements. This is especially likely if
all four are able to apply clubmechanisms inunison.
8.Discussion and conclusions
Theclimate club is emerging as apromising alternative for
mitigating global climate change.Recognizing theurgency
of addressing climate change and the shortcomings of the
all-inclusiveUNFCCCapproach, aclimateclubprioritizes
deeper reductions in carbon emissions by smaller groups
ofmoremotivated governments.However, the chances of
such a club succeeding would appear to be greatly
improved byUS involvement, an unlikely scenario for the
time being. Acknowledging the potential of sub-national
government involvement in minilateral actions of this
kind, it was demonstrated that climate club arrangements
that include US states may be able to maximize US
participation in lieuof involvement at thenational level.
Based on various motivation-level indicators, 12
of the 50US states were found to be ‘very likely’ to con-
sider clubmembership while a further nine states were
deemed to be ‘moderately likely’ to do so. In total,
these states account for 36.0% of national emissions
and 56.3% of GDP. Even so, 29 states were found to be
‘not likely’ to join a climate club based on these indica-
tors. Tellingly, ten of the 15 highest emitting states are
in this group, including Texas as the highest overall
emitter with the second-highest GSP.
Further investigation revealed that even less moti-
vated US states could potentially still be enticed into an
operational climate club via strong export dependencies,
particularly with the four key US trading partners—the
EU, Canada,Mexico and China. In fact, five of the seven
highest emitting ‘not likely’ states, and 10 ‘not likely’
states in total, were found to be among the highest quar-
ter of states when considering their individual export
dependencies in relation to total GSP. Collectively, these
states represent some 33.9% of emissions and 21.4% of
GDP, suggesting that a club including the four key US
trading partners may be capable of augmenting club
membership significantly via trade influences. This is
consistent with one important role of a climate club
recognized in the literature, namely to put pressure on
exports of non-members so as to encourage them to
become club members. In all, the analysis suggests that
states representing a total of 69.9% of national emis-
sions, 10.8% of global emissions and 77.7% of total US
GDPmaybe amenable to clubmembership.
The method devised for assessing likely members
within the study provides a broad first analysis of the
architectures that could evolve should climate clubs
become a reality and offers an example of trade-related
mechanisms that could influence further club growth.
Nevertheless, we fully recognize the legal and political
hurdles that climate clubs could face, including those
employing a multi-level structure. Such hurdles have
already receivedmuch attention in the literature, and still
merit further research, particularly in the context of the
ongoing discussion regarding environmental policy and
protectionmeasures permitted by theWorldTradeOrga-
nization (Cottier et al 2009). Here we merely intended to
offer a new angle on the composition of climate clubs and
the selectionofpotentialmembers atmultiple levels.
While it is easy to judge proposals for genuinely
solving climate change as politically difficult, con-
sidering the limitations of the Paris Agreement and the
urgency of implementing effective climate action
sooner rather than later, the time is ripe for debating
daring solutions. More ambitious policies within a
small coalition of powerful and motivated countries
and sub-national governments already promise sig-
nificant emissions reduction in the short run. More
importantly, through moral and economic pressure
exerted on non-members, such a climate club could
expand over time and thus significantly contribute to a
transition towards a global policy level playing field.
This would allow for harmonized and gradually more
stringent climate policies worldwide.
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